The fuzzy non-cooperative game with fuzzy payoff function is studied. Based on fuzzy set theory with game theory, the fuzzy Nash equilibrium of fuzzy non-cooperative games is proposed. Most of researchers rank fuzzy number by its center of gravity or by the real number with its maximal membership. By reducing fuzzy number into a real number, we lose much fuzzy information that should be kept during the operations between fuzzy numbers. The fuzzy quantities or alternatives are ordered directly by Yuan's binary fuzzy ordering relation. In doing so, the existence of fuzzy Nash equilibrium for fuzzy non-cooperative games is shown based on the utility function and the crisp Nash theorem. Finally, an illustrative example in traffic flow patterns of equilibrium is given in order to show the detailed calculation process of fuzzy Nash equilibrium.
Introduction
Game theory was firstly proposed by Von Neumann and Morgenstern in the book named "Theory of Games and Economic Behavior" in 1944. Then the game theory had become a subject, and many people had been absorbed in the study of game theory. So far, many new investigation directions have been created on game theory, one of which is fuzzy game theory. As the extension of crisp games, fuzzy games can be divided into two cases, which are fuzzy cooperative games and fuzzy non-cooperative games respectively. In this paper, we mainly study the later one. Up to now, many researchers take research on fuzzy non-cooperative games. Reference [1] discussed existence of equilibrium solution for a noncooperative game with fuzzy goals and parameters. Reference [2] defined the safe point as the solution of mixed fuzzy multi-objective many-person non-cooperative game and also showed the existence of safe point. Reference [3] Manuscript received March 10, 2008 . *Corresponding author. This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (70771010). studied n-person static fuzzy non-cooperative games. Reference [4] studied the equilibrium solutions for the multiobjective bi-matrix games with fuzzy payoff and fuzzy goals. Reference [5] proved the equilibrium strategy for fuzzy games by tools of multi-criteria decision making and fuzzy set theory. Reference [6] proposed fuzzy equilibrium of fuzzy games by introducing the fuzzy fixed point. Reference [7] described general playing rules in the fuzzy two-person games and formulated non-cooperative fuzzy games. Reference [8] made a study on two-person games with fuzzy strategy set. This kind of fuzzy games is defined to be a set of rules that determine the possible exchange of information between the participants in the games. Reference [9] investigated fuzzy two-person games whose options were uncertain.
Almost all of the above researchers ranked fuzzy number by its center of gravity or by the real number with its maximal membership when they discussed the equilibrium strategy. In doing so, fuzzy games were transformed into crisp games, so the fuzzy equilibrium strategy was equal to crisp one. Thus, much uncertain information had been lost and the fuzzy games were not the real fuzzy games yet. From this viewpoint, we compare fuzzy payoff values directly by ranking fuzzy numbers. Based on this kind of ranking method, the fuzzy Nash equilibrium is proposed. Furthermore, the existence of fuzzy Nash equilibrium is proved by the preference relations.
Preliminaries
In this section we remind some concepts on fuzzy numbers and operations on them. Let us start with reminding the most general definition of a fuzzy number.
Let U be a reference set, a fuzzy subsets A of U is defined by a membership function µ A : U → [0, 1], where µ A , ∀x ∈ U , indicates the degree to which x belongs to A. Definition 1 A fuzzy number A is a normal convex fuzzy set in the space of real numbers R with the membership function µ A upper semi-continuous on R.
Let us remind that a fuzzy set A in R is convex if and only if its membership function is quasi concave, i.e., it fulfills the following condition:
A fuzzy set A is normal if and only if there exists x ∈ R such that µ A (x) = 1.
We denote the set of all fuzzy numbers as F (R). Let us notice that a real number y is a special case of a fuzzy number with the membership function
Definition 2
The α-cut of a fuzzy set A is the set:
It follows from the properties of the membership function of a fuzzy number A that each its α-cut A α is a closed interval. We will denote it by
Now we remind the definition of the special case of a fuzzy number, introduced by Dubois et al [10] . Let L and R be two decreasing functions from 
where
The functions L and R are called shape functions. Letting X L = inf{x|L(x) = 0}, we restrict range of variable x to the interval [0, X L ]. On this assumption, inverse function of any shape function exists. We denote the inverse functions of L by L −1 . Then the α-cuts of a fuzzy number A with shape functions L and R take the following form
In this paper, we denote a fuzzy number A of L − R type by the following notation, i.e., A = (a, a, θ A , ω A ) LR . And we denote the set of all fuzzy numbers of L − R type by F LR (R). Obviously, F LR (R) ⊂ F (R).
In order to carry out operations on fuzzy numbers we use Zadeh's extension principle. Let * ∈ {+, −, ×} denote one of three operations (we apply in the paper only three operations). The proper extended operation, denote by * ∈ { +, −, ×}, is defined as follows. For any A, B ∈ F (R), A * B is a fuzzy number with the membership function
It is not easy to apply (3) in calculation directly. However, calculating α-cuts of the fuzzy number A * B is an easy task in each case as the following property holds for any fuzzy number A and B.
Property 1 For any A, B ∈ F (R), the following relations hold for each α ∈(0,1]:
Note that (7) is a special operation of extended multiplication " ×" where λ is a real number. However, if we limit ourselves to fuzzy numbers of the L − R type, then the following property of these numbers can be used to perform the above extended operations.
Property 2 Let λ ∈ R, A, B ∈ F LR (R), the following equalities hold
Property 3 For any A, B ∈ F (R), the following equalities hold
− α (12) where λ, α ∈ R, λ > 0 and α ∈ (0, 1]. Specifically, if λ ∈ (0, 1), the following holds
Proof Let λ > 0. By (6) and (7), we can get that (11) and (12) hold for λ > 0.
When λ ∈ (0, 1), by (5) and (7)
. Thus, (13) holds for λ ∈ (0, 1).
Ranking the fuzzy set
In this section, we will introduce some definitions about crisp relation, and then Yuan's fuzzy preference relation Q will be given. Due to the relative good properties of Yuan's ranking fuzzy numbers method, we will state an approach to order fuzzy quantities or alternatives based on Yuan's fuzzy preference relation Q. The approach will be very critical for the proof of fuzzy Nash equilibrium.
Crisp ordering relations
Let X be a non-empty set. Given two elements x, y ∈ X, the basis for a decision "between" x and y is given by some kind of ordering of the type "x is preferred to y", "y is preferred to x", "neither one is preferred to the other". We denote "x is preferred to y" by "x y". Then it is close at hand to define x y by y x, and define 
Definition 6
Let be a preference-ordering on X. Then is weakly convex if and only if T ( , x) is convex for all x ∈ X.
Definition 7 Let
be a preference-ordering on X. Then is continuous if and only if
Fuzzy ordering relations
Definition 8 A fuzzy binary relation P on X is a fuzzy subset of X × X with the membership function µ P (x, y),∀x, y ∈ X, where µ P (x, y) represents the truth level or the strength of the relation between x and y in order pair (x, y), µ P = 1 means that the relation is true or the strongest, and µ P = 0 means that the relation is false or the weakest.
Some properties are desirable with a fuzzy ranking method. A ranking method should be able to represent rational human behavior in terms of consistency and coherence in preference ordering. Hence, the next definition is necessary.
Definition 9
Let P be a fuzzy binary relation on the region X. P is fuzzy total ordering if and only if the following properties hold:
(a) F -reciprocity: Definition 11 A fuzzy preference relation P is robust iff for any given A, B ∈ F (R) and ε > 0, there always exists δ > 0 for which
where A / is an approximation of A, and d( A, A / ) is the maximum difference between A / and A.
The robustness of fuzzy preference relation can be stated as that: if A / is very close to A, for any B, the degree of preference of A / over B should also be very close to the degree of preference of A over B.
Yuan's fuzzy ranking methods
We assume that the basic problem is to choose between n alternatives with the outcome or the performance measured by fuzzy utilities
We also suppose that all fuzzy utilities take on values are represented by fuzzy numbers. In order to compare these alternatives, a preference relation
To define a preference relation of A i over A j , Yuan [11] did not directly compare the membership function A i and A j directly. Instead, Yuan used the membership function of A i − A j to indicate the preferability of alternative i over j, and then compare A i − A j with zero.
Definition 12
For any i, j ∈ N , define Q( A i , A j ) as a fuzzy preference relation of A i and A j by the membership function
In the following, we will state an approach to order fuzzy quantities or alternatives based on Yuan's binary fuzzy relation Q on { A i : i ∈ N }. Then we can rank fuzzy numbers according to the membership
where the symbol " A i Q A j " means A j is less preferred to A i base on Yuan's fuzzy ranking relation Q. The above fuzzy preference relation defined by Yuan have the following good properties, which have been proved by Yuan in 1991.
Theorem 1 The fuzzy preference relation
. By above two theorems and Definition 9, we can conclude that the fuzzy preference relation Q is a fuzzy total ordering. Furthermore, it has also been shown that the fuzzy preference relation Q has the following theorem [12] .
Theorem 3
The fuzzy preference relation Q has the
Yuan has proved that the fuzzy preference relation Q has also satisfied the following theorem.
Theorem 4
Yuan's definition of fuzzy ordering relation µ Q is robust, i.e., for any i, j ∈ N , and ε > 0, there exists δ > 0 for which
Proposition 1 The binary crisp relation
Q is a pre-
where the symbols "∨" and "∧" denote the maximum and minimum operators, respectively.
and vice versa.
Basic conceptions of fuzzy noncooperative games
For an easier understanding of fuzzy non-cooperative games, we first recall the basic concepts of crisp n-person non-cooperative games in normal (strategic) form.
Basic conceptions of crisp noncooperative games
A crisp n-person non-cooperative game in normal form is given by G = N, (S i ), (π i ) , where N ={1,. . . , n} is the set of players; S i = {s
mi } is the set of strategies of the ith player, where
S i is the set of strategy profiles of the game, 
For the conventional non-cooperative games, the following assumptions are made:
(a) The players are rational.
(b) There are no enforceable agreements between players.
(c) Each player knows all the data of the game G.
The game is played one time.
The non-cooperative aspect of the game is expressed by Assumption (b). The game G is said to be finite if the sets of strategies of all players are finite, otherwise it said infinite.
Remark 1 If each player i ∈ N chooses a strategy s
kn ) of the game is obtained. Then the ith player receives the payoff π i (s).
Since the game G is non-cooperative, then only selfenforcing solutions can be reasonable and rational for it. Nash [13] has introduced the following concept of equilibrium for the game G. 
The most important characteristic of Nash equilibrium is that if any player unilaterally deviates from it, he cannot be better off. Thus, Nash equilibrium is a self-enforcing equilibrium. Not all games have Nash equilibrium. We have the following two important existence theorems for finite and infinite games. For the finite games, we need to introduce the mixed strategy before giving the existence of Nash theorem.
For every player i ∈ N , the mixed strategy for player i is a probability distribution on S i ,
For player i ∈ N , we can denote the set of his mixed strategies by X i . Let X:= (X (1) , X (2) , . . . , X (n) ) be a mixed strategy, where any X (i) ∈ X i . And let expectation
Thus, a game with mixed strategy can be expressed as G= N ,(X i ), (E i ) . Preparatory for the Nash equilibrium in G, we introduce denotation
. . . , X (n) ), which means that
Nash has proved that if a non-cooperative game has finite players, then this game must have Nash equilibrium in mixed strategy.
Theorem 5 [13] If the game G is finite it has a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies X * , i.e.,
Theorem 6 [14] Assume that in the game G the following conditions are satisfied:
(a) The set S i is a non-empty, convex and compact subsets of R ni , i ∈ N . Then the game G has Nash equilibrium.
Fuzzy non-cooperative games
In conventional n-person non-cooperative games in normal form, a payoff function π i (s) describes the payoff of player i on the strategy profile s ∈ S. Taking impression of information in decision making problems into account, we incorporate fuzzy payoff values, which are represented by fuzzy numbers π i (s). Assessing such fuzzy numbers π i (s) for all the strategy profile s ∈ S and each player i ∈ N , we can define as 
Definition 14 Let fuzzy non-cooperative game
Q be binary relation based on Yuan's fuzzy ranking method. s i ki * is dominant strategy of player i in G F = N, (S i ), ( π i ) , k i  *  ∈ {1, . . . , m i }, i ∈ N , iff the following holds
On the assumption that every player is rational in fuzzy games, so if the ith player has a dominant strategy, he is certain to choose it.
Definition 15
For fuzzy game
) is said to be a fuzzy Nash equilibrium if and only if ∀i ∈ N, ∀s
where s * −i := {s
Definition 16
A mixed strategy
is a probability distribution on the set S i of his pure strategies. The set of mixed strategies for play i is represented by
where i ∈ N .
Definition 17
If every player i ∈ N chooses a mixed strategy X (i) ∈ X i , an expected value of the fuzzy payoff for ith player is defined as the fuzzy number
Thus, a fuzzy game with mixed strategy can be ex-
Preparatory for the Nash equilibrium in G F = N , (X i ),( E i ) , we also introduce denotation
For this kind of fuzzy games, what we need to consider is whether all fuzzy games have Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, if not all the fuzzy game has Nash equilibrium, what kind of properties should the fuzzy games satisfy for the existence of Nash equilibrium? The case is discussed in more detailed below.
Existence of Nash equilibrium of fuzzy non-cooperative games
In this section, we prove the existence of Nash equilibrium of fuzzy non-cooperative games, which is called fuzzy Nash equilibrium in this paper. Then, an illustrative example is given, which helps us get a deep understanding of fuzzy non-cooperative games and fuzzy Nash equilibrium.
Existence of fuzzy Nash equilibrium
If we define non-cooperative games by preference relation, then both crisp games and fuzzy games can be written
where N is sets of players, |N | = n is the number of players in games,
is the set of feasible strategies of the ith player, where n i 1. i is all the possible preference relation on S i . For fuzzy games, the preference relation i is binary relation based on Yuan's fuzzy relation Q, i.e., Q i . Hence, the non-cooperative games with fuzzy payoff can be denoted by
we will have the following Nash theorem, of which the explicit proof can be seen in [14] .
(b) i is continuous preference relation, (c) i is weakly convex relation, then there exists Nash equilibrium in game G. 
By Definition 6, if we want to prove the relation Q i is weakly convex, then we merely need to show that T is convex.
Let λ> 0, α ∈ [0, 1], any A j , A k ∈ T . Due to Property 3,
As a result,
Hence, for ∀λ ∈ (0, 1),
By Theorem 3,
By (13),
Hence, the following formula holds
By expressions (16) and (17) and the F -transitivity of
Due to the arbitrariness of A j and A k belonging to T , we conclude that T is convex. Further, Q i is weakly convex. This theorem reduces the problem of finding possible Nash equilibrium for n-person fuzzy games to fuzzy preference relation. In this paper, we have proved that if the fuzzy preference relation is Yuan's ranking method, then there exists Nash equilibrium for n-person fuzzy games whose strategy set is non-empty, compact and convex set. The restrictive condition implies that the strategy set is infinite. In other words, the above theorem is not for n-person fuzzy games that have finite pure strategy. However, as the corollary of Theorem 8, n-person fuzzy games can also have Nash equilibrium in mixed strategy as follows. For any i ∈ N , let X i is mixed strategy set of player ith. By Definition 16, X i is just the set of all the probability distributions on S i . Thus, it is obvious that X i is not empty, compact, convex set in some real space. Hence, this corollary is obvious by the Theorem 8. Now we have proved that each fuzzy non-cooperative game has Nash equilibrium whether it is infinite or finite. Hence, there always exist solutions for n-person fuzzy games no matter whether its strategy set is infinite or finite. Also, we can get the explicit Nash equilibrium solution by the Yuan's preference relation. In the coming section, an illustrative example of two-person fuzzy game is given to show the computation process of Nash equilibrium.
An illustrative example
It was pointed out [15] that there exists the traffic flow patterns of equilibrium in transportation networks and the state of its equilibrium, each trip maker chooses the least cost path between his origin and destination in such a way that no trip maker can change his trip route on his own so as to reduce his travel cost. Up to now, Wardrop equilibrium principle is valid only if every user is completely familiar with the transportation networks and traffic situation, and therefore, can make a deterministic optimal path choice. The behavior of such users must be reasonable in order to not make errors in choosing path.
In reality, however, it is very difficult to have the traffic situation at one's finger tips. Human perception and intuitive judgment play a central role in route choices. Therefore, it is impossible to have a precise estimation of the trip cost available to many paths. We consider that the trip cost is a fuzzy notation. Because of the difference among trip makers, a trip maker does not make deterministic and optimal decision but rather adopts the stochastic choice which he or she feels satisfactory for path choosing under the expected traffic situation in a network (constraint satisfaction in terms of traffic situations).
From the point view of game theory, this characteristic suggests that a game played by trip makers in mixed strategies, instead of pure strategies is appropriate. Let O and D be one pair of origin-destination, i.e., two different points in the networks. There is a state between O and D and there is an interaction among states. If we regard such interaction as prior experience information which is used for players (i.e., trip makers) to choose the strategies, the interaction can be classified into the payoff function rather than has the direct influence on the state. Therefore, we might as well consider that the states are independent each other. In this way, we can build the model of fuzzy game in networks as follows In order to show the detailed calculation process of fuzzy Nash equilibrium, we suppose that there are two paths between O and D, i.e., path 1 and path 2. Now two groups of trip makers are about to go from O to D on the assumption that the trip makers in one group would like to travel together, i.e., they want to go through the same path. Based on past experiences, their payoff functions can be estimated, but not very precisely: if the two group of trip makers choose path 1 together, both of their payoff are as much as 20, If one group chooses to go by path 1 and the other choose path 2, the one who goes to D from O in path 1 will get no less than 36 and the other one who goes from path 2 obtain approximately 30, if both of two groups choose path 2, then both of their payoffs are not more than 11. Does the fuzzy game have Nash equilibrium?
In this context, we can see that payoff value under every strategy cannot be denoted by real numbers. However, we can use fuzzy numbers to describe this kind of fuzzy information. Since the good properties of L − R fuzzy numbers, we suppose that the fuzzy utilities are L − R fuzzy numbers. Also, it is no lost of generality to assume that L(x) = R(x) = max{0, 1 − x}and the utilities in this example can be written as A = (a, a, θ A , ω A ) 
